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COGNITION. CONATION
AND CONNOTATION
Anna G. Grebo
Braintree, Mas$CIchusetts

Consciousness is essentially a system of meanings that
may be cognitive (perceptual, conceptual, etc.) or
affective (values with a conative factor are always
implied in affectivity.) These two cognitive and affective
aspects of meaning always go together; none is present
without the other, although they may be examined
separately. *
How little understood are the implications for education of what
Piaget is saying here was brought home to me strikingly during a
recent meeting of a graduate seminar in reading. In the course of
a discussion on what constitutes "appeal" for children of various
reading materials and methods, one member of the seminar made
reference to Dr. Richard Jones' Fantasy and Feeling in Education
(New York University Press, 1968), in which is related a series of
classroom episodes involving the presentation of sections of ESI's
much-publicized curriculum, "Man: A Course of Study." The children-twenty fifth-graders in an experimental summer school in Newton, Massachusetts-had just been exposed to vividly colorful and
powerfully silent films which touched upon the Netsilik Eskimo's
necessity-enforced cultural pattern of sometimes leaving behind to
die in the ice and snow the very old (and occasionally the very youngunwanted girl infants) who were unable to travel from one place
to another in the never-ending search for food. The children had
strong emotional reactions to these films, but, rather than stopping to
explore these, the teachers, for the most part, completed the suggested lesson plans, which attempted to maintain throughout an
objective focus on the material.
At this point in our seminar discussion, I interjected that I recalled
reading further in the same chapter of Dr. Jones' book a communication from the dance teacher to whom the children went immediately
following their social studies class. In the memorandum, she had expressed her consternation at being presented consistently with themes
of sorrow, death, and abandonment in the children's movement. In
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short, she objected to her classes becoming almost exclusively a
cathartic release of emotional tensions engendered by the social
studies curriculum.
"But perhaps that's just where they should be expressed" was the
comment forthcoming from one of the seminar participants-a comment that struck me forcibly as revealing the pivot on which turns
our conception (and some might say misconception) of the educational
process. To my mind, the whole cultural bias towards dichotomization
of intelligence and feeling, thought and emotion, science and art, is
laid bare in that remark. It belongs to the same category as the commonly heard admonition never to mix business and pleasure (or
friendship.) The underlying assumption of both remarks is that the
world of public knowledge and the realm of private feeling are
separate and basically incompatible.
What my fellow student was expressing was the very common-I
would say prevalent-attitude among educators that the classroom
and thus the school is a place to assimilate knowledge and not a
place to air personal feelings. What one does with the emotional
"side effects" of learning is a private matter. Hopefully, they will be
"worked off" in athletics or "expressed" in artistic activities, or at
worst (or, perhaps, to some minds, at best) simply "forgotten," a
term which translates into psychoanalyese as "repressed."
But this attitude just does not take seriously to heart or to mind
what Piaget and other insightful psychologists and philosophers as
well as perceptive practitioners of education are saying. True enough,
the classroom has been set up primarily to facilitate the assimilation
of knowledge. But the con census of the Magi--of all times and
climes-is that knowledge without self-knowledge is not worth
knowing. This is essentially what Piaget is saying when he tells us:
Intelligence thus begins neither with knowledge of the
self nor of things as such but with knowledge of their
interaction, and it is by orienting itself simultaneously
toward the two poles of that interaction that intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself.*
It is the self-knowledge pole of that orientation that is lit up in
the process of "accommodation," the Piagetian term for the reorganization of the cognitive structure literally to accommodate the new
knowledge which, thus transformed, becomes part of the structural
basis for assimilating even more complex knowledge. Translated into

*

Jean Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, Norton, 1951 (1945).

rh-153
practical education terms, this means that without allowance for
and even aid to the accommodating process (which implies the
personally evaluative, essentially private sphere of affectivity), subsequent "assimilations" of knowledge can be like so many castles
constructed on sand. The next shift in the wind of attention will
disintegrate them; for the underlying foundation that only felt meaning can provide will never have been realized. In reading, this understanding-in-depth and integration with already existent structures of
"prehension" goes, by and large, under the name of comprehension~
which term even sounds like what it means-to grasp and create a
meaningful whole out of garnered information or experience. Knowledge which has not made the connection with the affective schemas
that results in accommodation and thus in equilibrium is not selfrealized knowledge-knowledge which can expand or raise the level
of conscious awareness. Thus it is meaningless for the person and
thereby rendered incapable of entering into subsequent mental developments. In other words, little "significant" learning has taken placea few or more than a few bits and scraps of information committed
to short-term memory, then reproduced on test paper, without there
ever having been experienced the meaning without which the knowledge cannot become an integral part of the cognitive equipment
of the organism.
Back for a final look at the classroom where the children were
viewing the films of Eskimo life-presumably one of the main points to
be gotten across is that man is identifiably Man with ultimately the
same problems to face however differently he goes about solving them
within the framework of his particular culture and within the scope
of his particular level of development. Children denied the opportunity
of expressing and airing in open discussion their initial reactions of
repugnance and dismay at disturbing revelations about the Eskimo's
cultural values and practices will probably not make this primary
identification of (and more importantly with) the Netsilik as a fellow
human being, and thereby a valuable opportunity for broadening
the child's world-view as well as deepening his understanding of
himself in relation to his own cultural pattern is lost.
Fortunately not irretrievably so for the twenty Newton youngsters,
for one of the teachers involved in presenting these studies insisted
on being permitted to follow her teacher's "instinct" and encouraged
the children to express openly their honest reactions to the impact
of such seemingly radically different cultural values. The discussion
that ensued not only considerably eased the tensions but allowed for
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the resolution of these conflicts into the realization that providing
for the very old (and the very young) are problems common to all
cultures and that death, and thus life, itself is interpreted differently
in different cultural contexts. After these particularly rewarding (from
everyone's point of view) sessions, the dance instructor expressed
her gratitude for no longer having to contend almost exclusively with
motifs of death and abandonment in the children's movement. She
could now, she said, begin to lead them into more varied forms of
expressive movement.
So many of the tirades against our culture and times have been
directed at what Owen Barfield has called "the growing general
sense of meaninglessness." In an article entitled "The Rediscovery
of Meaning," (Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 7, 1961) he says that
"It is this which underlies most of the other threats. How is it that
the more able man becomes to manipulate the world to his advantage, the less he can perceive any meaning in it? ... Penetration to
the meaning of a thing or process, as distinct from the ability to
describe it exactly, involves a participation by the knower in the
known."
All well and good, one may counter. But, while this is in all
probability an accurate intuition about where and what the problem
is, "feeling" and "meaning" have been philosophy's and psychology's
perennial enigmas, the roots of whose perplexity are sunk so deep
that one Professor T. H. Pears, writing in 1923 in Remembering and
Forgetting, said, not altogether facetiously, "If the discovery of the
psychological nature of Meaning were completely successful, it might
put an end to psychology altogether." The question remains, just
how does one go about determining whether a given program of study
affords optimum conditions for the nurturance of these "esoteric"
qualities?
Far from wishing to get enmeshed in a philosophical unravelling
of the "meaning of meaning," I would like instead simply to throw
out the suggestion that, in the light of current research and thinking
about the role of perceptual processes in helping to bring about the
coalition of affect and intellect which we call understanding, feeling
and meaning may perhaps be seen to possess a more substantive nature
than we have hitherto recognized.
Investigators of the psychology of perception have helped to set
the stage for a psychological reevaluation of feeling and meaning.
Gardner Murphy and C. P. Sollery, in their book, Development of
the Perceptual World (Basic Books, Inc., 1960), point out that most
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psychological theories implicitly (and psycho-analysis, explicitly)
acknowledge the close interweaving of perception and cognition with
the affective processes, especially during childhood. They postulate
the existence of what they call "primary meanings," which are "differentiations of sensory events, of percepts, and of responses which
occur innately, being part and parcel of the individual's biological
inheritance" (p. 312). These primary meanings provide the basis
from which or upon which all subsequent "habits" of differentiating
or assimilating experience through learning are formed. "As for
meaning," they write, "we have asserted our belief that meaning is
essentially differentiation and integration of sensory, perceptual, and
motor events which have implicative or prognostic value for other
sensory, perceptual, or motor events" (p. 314).
Rudolf Arnheim, from the standpoint of the psychology of art,
views the perceptual process in a similar manner. In an article entitled
"Perceptual Abstraction and Art," (Psychological Review, 1947, p.
54), he maintains that "the individual stimulus configuration enters
the perceptual process only in that it evokes a specific pattern of
general sensory categories, which stands for the stimulus in a similar
way in which in a scientific description a network of general concepts
is offered as the equivalent of a phenomenon of reality." "If this
theory be acceptable," he goes on to say, "the elementary processes
of perception, far from being mere passive registration, would be
creative acts of grasping structures even beyond the mere grasping
and selecting of parts. What happens in perception would be similar
to what at a higher psychological level is described as understanding
or insight." He calls for a new approach-a psychological reevaluation of the relationship between the development of perceptual and
representational concepts and of mental growth in general.
In another article, entitled "Visual Thinking," (Education of
Vision, Gyorgy Kepes, Ed., 1965), he suggests that, in our ignorance
of the importance of the role of perception in thought processes, we
may be over-stressing the verbal concept to the neglect of the underlying structural sources of meaning.
But to refute the assumption (that the only possible
vehicle of concepts are words) it seems to me sufficient
to point to cats, dogs, monkeys and our own speechless
infants, who indicate by their behavior that they live in
a world of constant entities. Indeed, words are but
labels, and there can be no labelling before the senses
have furnished defined kinds of things.
Developmental psychology would seem to offer support to Arn-
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heim's statement. Jonas Langer, writing of cognitive development in
Theories of Development (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969),
points to the findings of Piagetian researchers in their study of the
relationship of linguistic development to the attainment of the concept of conservation. "Our evidence," they write, "offers little, if
any, support for the contention that language learning per se contributes to ... the achievement of the conservation concepts." (Inhelder
et aI., 1966, p. 163). "Such findings," Langer says, "support the
hypothesis that the meaning of language is not passively acquired
from environmental sources, but rather is mentally constructed
(assimilated) by the child to accord with his internal schemes" (p.
136) .
In an application of this thought to education, others, like Arnheim, are suggesting that we might be short-sightedly, as it were,
pouring our richest nourishment on the outermost leaves of learning,
while the roots that must maintain the entire symbolic structure
wither untended-this in a culture where the "primal sanities" of
nature, to use Walt Whitman's phrase, are growing ever more
increasingly imperceptible.
Along this line, Robert Jay Wolff, in "Visual Intelligence in
General Education" (Education of Vision)~ decries the lack of
aesthetic order in today's "man-made" environment and suggests
that this absence of sensorial and spiritual nourishment in our surroundings coupled with the "pedagogical anxiety to induce quick
mastery of the signs and symbols of communicable knowledge" may
be at the bottom of our acknowledged failure to educate, in the
deepest sense of the word. "Could it be," he asks, "that the college
sophomore writes badly because his education has neglected to nourish
in him the experiential sources of good writing in its singleminded
pursuit of the means?" "One of these sources is the thoughtful eye,"
he maintains, and, "without its guidance, the road to literacy can
become a grammatical exercise and higher learning a vastly inflated
kindergarten. "
Mirko Balsaldella, writing in the same volume, makes explicit
reference to the process of reading in connection with visual image!)'.
In his article, "Visual Considerations," he asks us to consider that
"an idea is expressed by word symbols developed sequentially along
an imaginary line," and that "the organized 'coming together' of
these symbols elicits feelings and ideas, evokes images, describes things
and events." "Basically," he says, "in perceiving an object you see
only its form and color. For the perception to register in one's mind,

rh-157
it must relate to previous perceptions, to a concept of its essence.
Otherwise, it is as if we had not seen it, for our memory will have
retained no trace of it."
Still others are examining the effects of specific training in perception on the ability to learn how to read. Archie A. Silver, together
with associates Rosa A. Hagin and Marilyn F. Hersh, published the
results of their experiments "using the method of stimulation of
deficit perceptual areas ... to determine whether perception can be
modified by training and whether increased accuracy of perception is
reflected in improved reading achievement." In "Reading Disability:
Teaching Through Stimulation of Deficit Perceptual Areas," American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry~ 1967,37, pp. 744-752), they report:
Recent studies have shown that at least the beginning
aspects of reading are closely related to perceptual
abilities ... The results so far suggest that where perceptual defects are first trained out, reading instruction
at intermodal and verbal levels will have a better
chance of success . . . This principle of enhancing
neuro-physiological maturation before intermodal and
verbal methods are introduced has direct implication
in the prevention of reading and language disability.
Perceptual training at that critical age when the function normally develops may indeed enable the child
to grasp language material which would otherwise
escape him.
Some philosophers, among them, Ernst Cassirer, would have us
realize that meaning inheres not alone in the schematic apperception
of knowledge but exists apart from and prior to its assimilation by
cognitive structures-that there are recognizable "expressive characters" which exist in and of themselves. He writes, in The Philosophy
of Symbolic Forms~ Vol. III: Phenomenology of Knowledge~ (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) :
An expressive character is not a subjective appendage
that is subsequently and as it were accidentally added
to the objective content of sensation; on the contrary,
it is part of the essential fact of perception . . . If an
expressive meaning were not revealed to us in certain
perceptive experiences, existence would remain silent for
us . . . What is primarily apprehended here is life as
such far more than any individual spheres or centers
of life; what originally appears in expressive perception is a universal character of reality (pp. 73-74).
Rudolf Arnheim, too, stresses the universal character of these
perceptual elements that constitute the basis of all knowledge-
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elements he describes as a "configuration of forces" that is "significant not only for the object in whose image it appears, but for the
physical and mental world in general." In Art and Visual Perception:
A Psychology of the Creative Eye~ (University of California Press,
1954), he writes:
Motifs like rising and falling, dominance and submission,
weakness and strength, harmony and discord, struggle
and conformance, underlie all existence. We find them
within our own mind and in our relations to other people,
in the human community and in the events of nature.
Perception of expression fulfills its spiritual mission only
if we experience in it more than the resonance of our
own feelings. It permits us to realize that the forces stirring in ourselves are only individual examples of the
same forces acting throughout the universe. We are
thus enabled to sense our place in the whole and the
inner unity of that whole (p. 434).
Murphy and Solley weave this universal element into their
psychology of perceptual development, accommodating in their
theories "both the complex unravelling of symbols as practiced in
psychoanalysis and the quest for formal principles of structure and
order, as exemplified in Gestalt psychology." They write further:
In the same way, as illustrated for example in Rembrant's perception of the meaning of the human face,
or Schubert's and Beethoven's grasp of the possibility
of transforming a simple melodic line into a breathtaking new vision of life by adding alterations in tonality
or rhythm, we have sudden transitions to a higher
plane-a plane in which a richer isomorphism with
cosmic structure is achieved than sheer Gestalt principles in themselves would require. (Development of the
Perceptual World)
Indeed, expressive perception and expressive form would seem
to have much in common, if they are not identical, with aesthetic
feeling and artistic form, and, relating this to education, one might
begin to suspect that aesthetic quality, far from being some sort of
"fringe benefit" that can be considered only after subsistence has been
provided for, is to be ignored as a prime criterion of educational
materials and experiences only at the risk of meaninglessness.
Donald Arnstine, writing in Philosophy of Education: Learning
and Schooling (Harper and Row, 1967), forges a link between the
psychologies of aesthetic perception and education. He writes:
The arousal of affect, the stirring of emotion felt as
pleasurable, satisfying or absorbing, through the per-
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ception of form in experiential cues, is a natural way of
apprehending experience. It is sought after because the
present is not effaced but rather highlighted and fully
attended to. It is, in short, during the course of such
experience that we feel most fully alive. And it is such
experience that is best characterized as being aesthetic
in quality . . . What could be potentially more important in teacher education, then, than the kinds of studies
in the arts that can make prospective teachers more consciously aware of the features of things (such as lectures and books) that are potential cues for aesthetic
experience?
No less renowned a philosopher and interpreter of the arts than
Sir Herbert Read aligns himself with Arnheim, Cassirer, and the
others in strongly advocating a policy of education that places the
training of sensory and perceptual abilities through the arts at its
center. His thinking seems to embody the "significant configurations"
of Arnheim and the "expressive characters" of Cassirer as well as
drawing upon Carl Jung's theory of archetypes. In "Art as a Unifying
Principle in Education," (Child Art, Hilda Present Lewis, Ed., 1966,
Diablo Press), he defines consciousness itself as the developing awareness of form, that is, "the ability to retain sensations as images, to
compare and combine such images into meaningful structures." These
very structures, he maintains, become a part of the warp and woof
of the evolving structure of the mind itself. They become the "physically
determined patterns of perception" that control the "habits" of our
minds.
The mind, in its effort to arise from the amorphous
pool of sensations and feeling, clings to a scaffold of
precise geometric figures. Nowhere is this more clearly
demonstrated than in the slow but certain emergence of
basic form from the apparently aimless scribbling activity
of a child. Form, the basic pattern, precedes identity,
precedes significance, controls imagination, determines
intelligence. The archetypes are the structural elements
of visual order, of cognition itself, and the archetypes
are by definition universal.
Even modern physics seems to have discovered these forms"dynamic factors that manifest themselves in impulses . . . pieces of
life itself-images that are integrally connected to the living individual
by the bridge of the emotion." (C. G. Jung, AI an and His Symbols.)
In the chapter entitled "Models for Theory" of Visual Thinking,
Arnheim describes Physicist Gerald Holton's concept of "themata,"
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which the latter considers the underlying principles of scientific conceptions. Themata, says Arnheim, refer to
thought models that derive neither from empirical
statements, such as meter readings, nor from analytical
ones, reliant on the calculus of logic and mathematics.
Holton does not wish to commit himself as to whether
these themata should be associated 'with any of the following conceptions: Platonic, Keplerian or Jungian
archetypes or images; myths (in the non-derogatory
sense, so rarely used in the English language); synthetic a priori knowledge; intuitive apprehension or
Galilei's 'reason'; a realistic or absolutistic or, for that
matter, any other philosophy of science.'
Arnheim himself says, "I am treating these themata as mental
images, and I trust that even persons who like to distinguish modern
science in principle from what preceded it will be struck by the formal
resemblances discussed here."
It is, I feel, worth the consideration of educators at all levels
that perhaps some of the learning, and more specifically, reading
problems that seem to afflict our Western culture (more so than in
the East? [See Kiyoshi Makita, "The Rarity of Reading Disability
in Japanese Children," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry~ 1968,
38, pp. 599-613]) are due, at least in part, to the more widespread
cultural phenomenon alluded to in the writings cited earlier in this
paper. Is it possible that we are having to "pay the price for the
spectacular successes in the sciences made possible by theorizing with
disembodied concepts" (Arnheim), neglecting, moreover, to nurture
the "experiential sources" within while proceeding to obliterate the
"primal sanities" of nature in our environment?
Perhaps we should reread and reevaluate in the twin lights of
the psychology of perception and the philosophy of symbolic forms
the much-quoted passage from Einstein's letter to Jacques Hadamard
describing his own creative processes of thinking.
The words of the language, as they are written or
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism
of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as
elements of thought are certain signs and more or less
clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced
and combined . . . Taken from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory play seems to be the essential
feature in productive thought-before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other kinds
of signs which can be communicated to others ... The
above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual
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and some of muscular type. Conventional words or
other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a
secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play
is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will.
(Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, Princeton University Press, 1945).
In this treatise, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series
of Letters the German poet-philosopher and close friend of Goethe,
Friedrich Schiller, predicted the outcome of perpetuating a system
of education that was not based on the principles of aesthetic and
therefore natural order. At this moment in history we would seem
to be living the fulfillment of his prediction.
The old principles will remain, but they will wear the
dress of the century, and philosophy will lend its name to
an oppression which was formerly authorized by the
Church. Terrified by the freedom which always declares
its hostility to their first attempts, men will in one place
throw themselves into the arms of a comfortable servitude, and in another, driven to despair by a pedantic
tutelage, they will break out into the wild libertinism
of the natural state. Usurpation will plead the weakness
of human nature, insurrection its dignity, until at
length the great sovereign of all human affairs, blind
force, steps in to decide the sham conflict of principles
like a common prize fight.
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